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1 Introduction
Does the introduction of tuition fees improve the quality of higher education? Numerous
voices throughout Europe support this view, stating that fees are heavily needed to sup-
plement public educational expenditures in order to bring funding back to internationally
adequate levels (European Commission, 2005; HRK, 2005; Van der Ploeg and Veugelers,
2008; Ritzen, 2009).1 On the contrary, critics argue that enhanced access to private ﬁ-
nancing sources would actuate a withdrawal of public funding, such that the eﬀect on total
educational spending would be low or even zero.This fear is fuelled by experiences in the UK
and Australia after the introduction of tuition fees, succinctly summarized by Barr (2004, p.
342):
If fees are set by government, rising fee income can be oﬀset by falling taxpayer
contributions. ... Australia is a graphic example: government introduced centrally
set fees 1989 to address a funding crisis; by 2000, the system was back in crisis.
Equally, the introduction of fees in the UK did not net any extra money.
This paper develops a simple model of higher education ﬁnance to address the question
whether the option to implement tuition fees improves the quality of university education
and to what extent crowding out of public funds occurs. This question is of particular impor-
tance for the debate in Germany, where, similar to the above-mentioned countries, fees were
introduced gradually at levels determined by the political process. As a result, higher edu-
cation funding rests on both public and private sources being controlled by the government.
These features are typically neglected in models of university ﬁnance reform, which either fo-
cus on the polar alternatives of pure public vs. private spending (Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde,
2000; Wildasin, 2000; B¨ uttner and Schwager, 2004), or allow for individual adjustments of
higher education quality (Andersson and Konrad, 2003).2
In many countries, including Germany, the dispute on university reform goes hand in hand
with a discussion on the proper allocation of educational competencies, in particular between
federal and regional levels. From a theoretical perspective, decentralization is often challenged
due to a variety of interregional spill-overs, most notably graduate mobility undermining the
incentives for public funding on a regional basis.3 As this may constitute an argument why
tuition fees may serve to crowd out particularly regional public spending,4 we investigate
1 Of course, the discussion on the interrelation between ﬁnancing sources and quality is just one aspect in
the voluminous tuition fee debate. Other topics ﬁguring prominently in public discussion include lifetime
redistribution (Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte, 2002), and social selectivity due to ﬁnancial constraints (De
Fraja, 2001).
2 Therefore, our notion of ”private funding” means paying for a government service of predetermined quality
rather than private choice of educational quality.
3 See, e.g. Konrad (1995) and Wildasin (2000). However, things become more tricky when student mobility
is added; see Lange (2009) and Krieger and Lange (2010).Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 2
how their possible introduction aﬀects educational expenditures for both centralized and
decentralized decision making.
On the one hand, this distinction is novel to the literature, which addresses the disposability
of government instruments in terms of either diﬀerent expenditure categories (Konrad, 1995;
Poutvaara, 2004) or tax arrangements (Poutvaara, 2001). On the other hand, it is relevant
for the German case where fees are set by the federal states.5 Hence, lessons from countries
with more centralized fees like Australia and the UK may not apply.
Gradualism is an important characteristic of university funding reform. In the above men-
tioned countries, tuition fees have been introduced at moderate levels before further in-
creases.6 We take account of this feature by investigating two scenarios: ﬁrst, we consider
the introduction of tuition fees at a marginal level; second, we allow for the government to
have full discretion about the fee level.
We show that the eﬀects of tuition fees depend on the degrees of both educational centraliza-
tion and ﬂexibility in setting the fee level. Regarding marginal fees, we ﬁnd a full crowding
out of fee revenues under centralization. Private funding simply substitutes public funding
without any improvement of educational quality. However, with regional decision making,
per capita spending on higher education increases when marginal tuition fees are charged.
This diﬀerence originates in the higher ﬁscal appeal of attracting students to the region and
has an important implication for the assessment of educational federalism. The option to
utilize small scale fees can indeed provide an argument in favor of, rather than against a
decentralization of educational competencies. Our analysis identiﬁes situations where cen-
tralization leads to higher quality than decentralization when funding is restricted to be only
public, but decentralization performs better when tuition fees are admitted.7
When policymakers have full discretion about tuition fee levels, the picture changes. While
eﬀects under decentralization are basically unaﬀected, a centralized government now has the
4 Schwager (2008) argues in favor of tuition fees as an instrument to correct for the above mentioned
externalities eﬃciently.
5 In our model, we consider educational quality and expenditures as the policy instruments. There are
manifold options how to conduct and evade regional education competition. Konrad (1995) stresses the
encouragement of public infrastructure at the expense of public education, whereas Poutvaara (2004)
argues that higher graduate mobility shifts public educational resources into internationally less applicable
skills. Poutvaara (2001) shows that education is spurred by earmarking the tax payments of graduates
to the region where education was undertaken. Richter and Kunze (2010) show that mobility does not
necessarily aﬀect the structure of optimal education policy.
6 However, recent experiences like in Austria and the German states of Hesse and Saarland where tuition
fees were abolished after a short period of time highlight that increases are far from automatic.
7 This ﬁnding is rooted in a distortion of the incentives to support university education by the political
process. Not attending university himself, the decisive voter recognizes only the indirect beneﬁts of higher
education and neglects the positive direct eﬀects on students. This renders spending under centralization
ineﬃcient and opens up the possibility of a better provision by decentralization even though regions are
symmetric. Hence, our mechanism diﬀers signiﬁcantly from Besley and Coate (2003), where a superiority
of decentralized systems originates in the heterogeneity of individual preferences.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 3
option to extract the entire private return from educational investment by setting an appro-
priate fee. Receiving the whole surplus of higher education, the government sets the eﬃcient
level of quality. Hence centralization becomes advantageous regarding eﬃciency.8 Therefore,
our analysis highlights that the question of educational centralization versus decentraliza-
tion is highly sensitive with respect to the institutional environment: not only the general
availability of funding instruments, but also detailed restrictions on their scope matter.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basics of the model. Section 3
derives and compares spending levels under centralized and decentralized decision making
when tuition fees are banned. In section 4, this ban is abolished, ﬁrst allowing for marginal,
then for generic fee levels. Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider a federation formed by two ex ante identical regions i ∈ {A,B}. In both re-
gions, competitive ﬁrms employ capital and labor to produce the same output good by a
constant-returns-to-scale technology. Perfect access to the international capital market pegs
the interest factor at the level R for both individuals and ﬁrms. Hence, the wage per eﬃciency
unit of labor w is constant as well.
In both regions, a mass of people - each normalized to unity - lives for two periods t = 1,2.
Individuals are heterogeneous in terms of the ability to beneﬁt from higher education, a, and
the costs of moving into the other region in period 1 and 2, denoted by µt, t = 1,2.
The ability distribution is bimodal. In each region, the mass A < 1 of people is born with
a high ability to beneﬁt from university education (a = 1), whereas the rest (1 − A) has no
such talent (a = 0). Hence, the overall number of talented individuals is 2A.
At the beginning of the each period, individuals are informed about their individual realiza-
tion of the respective mobility cost. These costs reﬂect not only immediate moving costs,
but also non-monetary implications of leaving a familiar environment. As these facets may
be considered positive by some individuals, we allow for non-positive values of total mobility
cost. For the sake of concreteness, costs are uncorrelated between periods and µt follows a






t ≤ 0,µt ≥ 0. Hence, the probability of
facing a migration cost µt is 1/(µt − µ
t).
In period 1, people decide where to reside and whether to take up a study or not. Going to
university augments the eﬀective supply of labor in period 2 to:
1 + ah(e),
8 However, a full comparison would have to take into account how the government budget will be utilized.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 4
where h(·) is a human capital production function with the usual properties (h0 > 0,h00 <
0,h0(0) = ∞ and h(0) = 0). Human capital depends on total higher education expenditures
or quality e = g+f, the sum of both public funds g and tuition fees f.9 Taking into account
income taxation at the rate τ and tuition cost gives lifetime net income:
IH =
(1 − τ)(1 + ah(e))w
R
− f.
Like Konrad (1995), Keen and Marchand (1997) and Poutvaara (2004), we treat the income
tax rate τ as ﬁxed throughout the paper. Hence, the paper focusses on the eﬀect of mobility
on educational and not on tax competition.10
Everyone who does not attend university supplies one eﬃciency unit of labor in both periods,
providing net lifetime earnings:






The decision to study is determined by a comparison of lifetime incomes. While untalented





− 1) ≥ f, (1)
that is, the increase in net earnings at least compensates for tuition cost. In what follows,
we refer to (1) as the student participation constraint: only when (1) is fulﬁlled, S = A while
S = 0 otherwise.








This expression achieves its maximum either by having no higher education at all (e = S = 0)
or by all talented going to university and receiving the same quality e∗, characterized by:
h0(e∗)w = R, (2)
9 It is well known from the empirical literature that not only ressources but also organization is important
for educational output (W¨ oßmann, 2008; Van der Ploeg and Veugelers, 2008). However, we concentrate
on the funding dimension, as our basic question is coined in these terms.
10 Krieger and Lange (2010) consider simultaneous tax and transfer competition among regions. However,
taking educational quality as given, their approach diﬀers severely from the present one.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 5
the equality of the marginal returns to investment in human and physical capital. To make
the problem meaningful, we posit that higher education is socially productive, that is, the




− 1)w > e∗. (3)
Because aggregate production is concave in e, social productivity exists for all e ∈ [e, ¯ e], both
bounds of the interval solving the equation (h(¯ e) − R)w = ¯ eR.
3 Public Funding of Higher Education
This section investigates spending on higher education when all funds are public, that is,
tuition fees are not allowed: f = 0. The level of public spending results from the political
process, which we assume to be characterized by Leviathan-type governments. Hence, the
interest of the government is to extract as much resources as possible from university students
and graduates.11
3.1 Centralization
Consider ﬁrst a setting where education spending is set by a central government aiming at
the maximization of the present value of net income tax revenues over both periods:




where the bar refers to the no tuition fee-case. Period 1 taxes are collected from all non-
students, whereas all workers pay the proportional income tax in period 2:
T1 = 2(1 − S)τw, T2 = 2τw[S(1 + h(g)) + (1 − S)].
Plugging these equations into (4) gives the tax revenue as a function of educational spending
in period 1:














11 This assumption which is popular in the literature (Andersson and Konrad, 2003) simpliﬁes the analysis
signiﬁcantly without aﬀecting the basic insights. Alternatively, all results regarding spending decisions
could be reproduced in a more sophisticated OLG-model with a gerontocracy, that is the elderly have
the political power (Konrad, 1995). Similar ﬁndings would arise if the decisive voter was an untalented
individual, although his preferences for local spending would be aﬀected by his own future mobility.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 6
where the ﬁrst term is the net ﬁscal return from running a university system. For public
spending on higher education to be appealing for the government, this expression must be
positive, which imposes two prerequisites on the educational quality. First, quality must be







− g ≥ 0 (6)
the ﬁscal eﬀectiveness constraint. Second, the student participation constraint (1) must be
met, which with pure public funding is tantamount to:
h(g)/R ≥ 1. (7)
The comparison of (6) and (7) reveals that ﬁscal eﬀectiveness implies student participation
under pure public funding. This holds because ﬁscal eﬀectiveness requires the additional
tax revenue from graduation to compensate the direct cost of education. Students, how-
ever, disregard both the direct cost and the taxation of earnings as the opportunity cost is
tax deductible by construction. Hence, individuals perceive higher gains and lower costs of
university education than the government does.
Maximizing (5), taking (6) into account, yields:
Proposition 1. Centralized pure public funding is positive only when the tax rate is
suﬃciently high. Positive spending levels are characterized by the condition:
τh0(¯ gC)w = R. (8)
For all τ < 1, centralized pure public higher education is underfunded.
Proof. (8) results from the maximization of (5) when (6) is ineﬀective. According to (8), ¯ gC
decreases monotonously in τ and approaches zero as τ → 0. Therefore, there exists a critical
tax rate τG for which the ﬁscal eﬀectiveness constraint (6) binds when ¯ gC is chosen. Hence,




h(¯ gC(τG)) − 1

= ¯ gC(τG),
where we have denoted the tax rate dependency of quality explicitly by writing ¯ gC(τG).
Regarding underfunding, we have ¯ gC(1) = e∗. Ineﬃciency for lower τ follows immediately
from
d¯ gC
dτ > 0 for τ ≥ τG and zero provision for τ < τG. 
The government’s motive to provide higher education originates in the appropriation of the
tax payments generated by university graduates. However, aggregate output increases by
more than these tax payments whenever the tax rate is not conﬁscatory.12 As in Konrad
(1995), this renders the incentives to ﬁnance university education inferior.13 For suﬃciently
low tax rates, higher education becomes even ﬁscally ineﬀective and is not provided at all.
12 To simplify the analysis, we have omitted any personal eﬀort cost of attending university. Obviously, the
presence of such a cost would destroy the incentives for university education for τ = 1 such that centralized
pure public education would never be eﬃcient.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 7
Funding higher education by general taxation is often criticized on grounds of regressive
redistribution (Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde, 2000). This property is present also in our model




increases monotonously in g. This is due to the fact that the government is not interested in
intra- or intergenerational redistribution, but simply wants to enlarge the tax base.
3.2 Decentralization
Consider now a situation where policies are chosen autonomously at regional levels. Similar












where i is the regional index. However, interregional mobility alters tax revenues and costs
in three distinctive ways.
First, mobility in period 2 implies that not all graduates of a region will also pay their income
taxes there. Graduate earnings being the same across regions due to the uniform income tax
rate, all households with negative mobility costs move to the other region at the beginning
of period 2. As a consequence, each region collects taxes from all its period-1 residents with
positive old age mobility cost µ2 and all period-1 residents of the other region with negative











τ(1 + h(gj))wSj + τw(1 − S), (11)
where j 6= i and the last term is due to the fact that the number of non-academics with
negative µ2 is the same in both regions.
Second, ﬁscal equalization drives a wedge between the taxes collected in a region and the
taxes actually received. Let δ ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of taxes that accrue to the region where
they were collected, revenues for region i amount to:
Ti
2 = τδTCi
2 + τ(1 − δ)TC
j
2.
13 Similar results obtain in Wigger and von Weizs¨ acker (2001) and Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte (2002). Wigger
and von Weizs¨ acker (2001) assume that the government maximizes a ”tax dividend” in the form of future
student earnings. However, they do not consider the problem of underfunding caused by an imperfect
appropriation of investment returns. In Bevia and Iturbe-Ormaexte (2002), altruistic parents are willing
to forego current tax revenue in order to ﬁnance higher education which fosters future redistribution among
the oﬀspring via a progressive income tax. In our model, tax revenues are simply conveyed to the general
budget.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 8
By using (11), this can be expressed as:
Ti











is a measure of the ﬁscal externality or ”leakage” of public investment due to graduate mobility
and ﬁscal equalization: Region i ends up with only the fraction 1−π of the tax payments of
its former students.
The third diﬀerence to centralization originates in the fact that the talented people born in i
need not study at the local university. They do so only if their period 1 mobility cost exceeds








where, in order to simplify the exposition, (13) presumes the student participation constraint
to be met in both regions.

















the subscript referring to the region of origin and the superscript to the region of study.
Accordingly, the number of students in i originating from j is 1 − Si
j, such that the total










with M1 = µ1 − µ















At last, everyone not attending university gets the same period 1 income in both regions.
Accordingly, only those with negative mobility cost move. Since the interregional net ﬂow
of non-students is zero, period 1 tax revenue is independent of the degree of educational
federalism: like in period 2, each region has (1 − S) non-academic residents so tax revenues
amount to Ti
1 = (1 − S)τw.
Therefore, the problem of the government of region i is to maximize (10) with respect to gi,
taking gj as given. In addition, student participation and ﬁscal eﬀectiveness have to hold at







− gi ≥ 0.
Because of ﬁscal leakage, this condition is stricter than (6), whereas the student participation
constraint (7) is structurally unaﬀected. Therefore, we can conclude that, if at all, only the
ﬁscal eﬀectiveness constraint will be binding under decentralization as well.











τ(1 − π)(1 + h(gi))w − giR
i
+ πτ(1 + h(gj))w
∂Sj
∂gi ≤ 0,
with strict inequality for gi = 0. This equation highlights the three budgetary eﬀects of
increasing educational expenditures at the regional level. First, it aﬀects the marginal return
per resident student, the diﬀerence between marginal tax revenues and cost. Second, it
attracts additional students who generate both tax revenue and cost. And third, the reduction
of students in the other region impinges on tax revenues to the extent of ﬁscal leakage.
Both countries being identical, we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium where gi = gj,Si =
Sj, and ∂Sj
∂gi = −∂Si












τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(¯ gD))w − ¯ gDR

= 0, (16)
or zero, depending on whether ¯ gD is ﬁscally eﬀective or not:
τw





− ¯ gD R 0. (17)
Equation (16) can be interpreted along the same lines as (15) with the slight modiﬁcation
that the second term denotes the regional ﬁscal gain from attracting a student adjusted for
the ﬁscal externality. Depending on the level of π, this gain can be positive or negative.
However, according to (16), a positive regional ﬁscal gain from attracting students implies a
negative marginal return per resident student and vice versa.



























as fulﬁlled. This can be ensured by a suﬃciently low sensibility of location choice with respect to quality
diﬀerentials: If M1 is suﬃciently high, the (negative) ﬁrst term dominates the possibly positive second
term. Note that the third term is always negative when education is ﬁscally eﬀective.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 10
For the following analysis, we posit that ∂2¯ ΩD
∂(¯ gD)2 < 0 in equilibrium, in order to exclude eco-
nomically dubious implications.15 To illustrate the importance of that assumption, consider
an increase in the interest rate. Increasing the opportunity cost of educational funding,









∂2¯ ΩD/∂(¯ gD)2 ·
"
−1 − 2
(1 − τ)h0(¯ gD)w
(µ1 − µ




∂(¯ gD)2 < 0.
The next two propositions summarize the main properties of the equilibrium. We start with
the tax rate perspective:
Proposition 2a. In the absence of ﬁscal externalities, decentralized pure public funding is
positive only if the tax rate is suﬃciently high. A tax rate increase produces ambiguous eﬀects
on the higher education quality level, unless student mobility is suﬃciently low.
Proof. When π = 0, (16) becomes h0(g)w−R = 0 for τ = 1. This is solved by the (positive)
eﬃcient quality. For τ = 0, all terms in (16) are negative, hence zero quality maximizes
revenue.
The ambiguity of the tax rate eﬀect on ¯ gD becomes obvious from considering:
d¯ ΩD
dτ












τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(¯ gD))w − ¯ gDR

. (18)
Working in diﬀerent directions under many circumstances, including π = 0, the second and
third term are dominated by the ﬁrst term when M1 is suﬃciently high. 
The indeterminacy of the reaction of the educational quality on the tax rate can be traced
back to the interplay of three eﬀects. First, a higher tax rate is beneﬁcial for quality as the
marginal ﬁscal return extracted from resident students increases. Second, the regional ﬁscal
gain from attracting a student is aﬀected. However, the sign of this eﬀect depends on the
extent of ﬁscal leakage, which determines whether it is better to have one taxpayer more in
the own or in the other region (π Q 1/2). Third, a higher tax rate makes the students in
both regions less sensitive to quality diﬀerentials, for the private return from moving abroad
declines. Whether this lower responsiveness is beneﬁcial of harmful, depends again on the
degree of ﬁscal leakage weighing the net gains from attracting another student relative to
relying on the ﬁscal externality. Only when student mobility is suﬃciently low, will the last
two eﬀect be of minor importance.
This ambiguity has an impact on the eﬃciency performance of decentralized higher education:
Corollary 1. Under decentralization, quality overprovision results if and only if educational
15 Also this condition can be ensured by a suﬃciently low response of students to quality diﬀerentials.
16 For the sake of brevity, we present the respective condition only for the case π = 0.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 11
quality is maximal for a tax rate lower than unity. Otherwise, underprovision obtains for all
τ < 1 and/or π > 0.
Proof. Due to
d¯ gD
dπ < 0, ¯ gD reaches the maximum level for any given tax rate when π = 0.
If π = 0 and τ = 1, (16) becomes (1−π)h0(¯ gD)w−R = 0, solved by e∗. Hence eﬃcient quality
is overmatched if and only if maximum quality obtains for a τ < 1. Otherwise, underfunding
results for all τ < 1 or π > 0. .
For a conﬁscatory tax rate, student mobility and hence quality competition become irrelevant.
Therefore, each region would invest eﬃciently in education if ﬁscal leakage was absent. As a
consequence, decentraization leads to overprovision only when incentives to attract students
are even stronger. A tax rate below 100% is a necessary, but not suﬃcient condition for this
to occur.
Let T denote the (probably non-closed) set of tax rates for which a positive quality is provided
under decentralization in the absence of ﬁscal leakage. Then we have the following result:
Proposition 2b. For every τ ∈ T, there exists a degree of ﬁscal leakage ¯ π ∈ [0,1], such
that equilibrium spending under decentralized pure public funding is positive for π ∈ [0, ¯ π]
and zero for π ∈ [¯ π,1]. For π < ¯ π, quality is decreasing in π. Moreover, there exists a level
of ﬁscal leakage ˜ π < 1/2, such that educational quality is higher under decentralization than
under centralization if π < ˜ π.





−τh0(¯ gD)w − 4τ(1 + h(¯ gD))
(1−τ)w2
M1R
∂2 ¯ ΩD/∂(¯ gD)2 < 0.
Moreover, ¯ gD approaches zero for π → 1, hence (17) becomes binding for some ¯ π < 1. Higher
ﬁscal leakage leads to zero provision.
For π = 0 and τ < 1, the second term in (16), the regional ﬁscal gain from attracting a
student, becomes unambiguously positive. By (8), (16) can only be fulﬁlled for ¯ gD > ¯ gC.
As ¯ gD is continuously decreasing in π, some ˜ π > 0 must exist for which ¯ gD = ¯ gC. However,
π = 1/2 renders the regional ﬁscal gain from attracting a student negative, from which
¯ gD < ¯ gC follows. When τ = 1, the second term in (16) is zero, hence ˜ π = 0 in this case. 
While the negative eﬀect of ﬁscal leakage on educational investment is straightforward, the
relative performance of decentralization is easily explained in terms of the strategic interre-












The sign of this expression equals the sign of the square bracketed term in the numerator,
which captures the basic educational tradeoﬀ faced by each region. On the one hand, itEducational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 12
has an incentive to attract students (that is, later taxpayers) by providing a better quality
than the competitor. This creates a strategic complementarity between local educational
expenditures. On the other hand, there is also a substitutability because each region can free
ride on the eﬀorts of the other region. The relative importance of these eﬀects is determined
by the extent of the ﬁscal leakage. When π = 0, regions appropriate all later tax revenues
of their students and compete ﬁercely for them such that expenditures are higher than with
centralization, possibly exceeding the eﬃcient level. Algebraically, (19) is positive and strate-
gic complementarity prevails. However, for π = 1 own educational investments would only
beneﬁt the other region. Therefore, an intermediate level of ﬁscal leakage exists for which
centralization and decentralization yield identical quality.
A political economy complement to the welfare-theoretic ﬁndings by Lange (2009), our result
puts some caution on the popular ﬁnding that decentralized education policies are inferior to
centralized ones. Konrad (1995), Justman and Thisse (1997) and Del Rey (2001) establish a
respective ﬁnding based on the mobility of graduates, but disregarding any beneﬁcial eﬀects of
attracting students to a region. In a model with student mobility only, B¨ uttner and Schwager
(2004) ﬁnd educational expenditures to be strategic substitutes between regions. However,
this result is driven by the assumption that each region cares for the earnings of all its citizens
irrespective of residence. Obviously, this downplays the ﬁscal eﬀect of graduates remaining
abroad.17
In contrast, Gradstein and Justman (1995) have shown that decentralization raises spending
levels. However, their argument is set up in terms of human capital investment of immobile
residents in order to attract mobile physical capital. In our model, educational spending is
a tool to attract students and their future tax payments. Moreover, decentralized spending
is always excessive in Gradstein and Justman (1995) because - in contrast to our model -
centralization would be eﬃcient.18
Nevertheless, centralization leads to better quality than decentralization in a number of cases,
including π = 1/2. Also, decentralization can even fail to supply of higher education, although
a centralized university system would exist (π > ˜ π).
4 Allowing for Tuition Fees
We now consider a setting where higher education can be ﬁnanced by both public and private
funds, such that e = g + f. In line with recent real-world reforms, we posit that the level of
tuition fees is set by the government and distinguish between two settings: the introduction
17 Moreover, the opposite result obtains with this regional target function once only graduates are allowed
to be mobile (Justman and Thisse, 2000).
18 In the same spirit, Konrad (1995) arrives at overprovision of public infrastructure in order to capture
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of small-scale fees on the one hand and full freedom of scope regarding fee levels on the other
hand. With all individuals having access to the perfect capital market and no uncertainty
about educational success, the well known problems of wealth-biased demand for privately
funded education are absent and require no further state intervention.19 As a consequence,
the analysis can concentrate on eﬃciency issues.
4.1 Small Scale Fees
As argued above, tuition fees are often phased in with low initial levels. In order to analyze
these (possibly short term) eﬀects, this subsection considers the marginal introduction of fees
to the model of section 3. In general, there are two questions at hand: First, how do such
fees aﬀect educational quality? And second, what about the incentives to utilize tuition fees?
We ﬁnd the degree of educational federalism to matter substantially for both questions.
4.1.1 Centralization






















− (e − f) ≥ 0. (21)
According to (21), the educational quality required to meet ﬁscal eﬀectiveness diminishes in
f: with quality unchanged, tuition fees improve the public budget. As the quality ensuring
student participation rises with the fee level, there exist thresholds:20







such that ﬁscal eﬀectiveness implies student participation for lower fees whereas the opposite
holds for higher fees. As ˆ f is strictly positive, only (21) needs to be considered when analyzing
the marginal introduction of fees. The according maximization of (20) yields:
Proposition 3. Under centralization, the government has an incentive to introduce tuition
fees whenever education expenditures are positive under pure public funding. However, the
19 As pointed out by Garcia-Pe˜ nalosa and W¨ alde (2000), the precise form of fee repayment facilities matters
for student risk taking under uncertainty. See Poutvaara (2004) for an extension of the analysis of tuition
fee designs to the presence of graduate mobility.
20 (22) results from equating (21) and (1). Intuitively, the student participation and the ﬁscal eﬀectiveness
constraints are binding simultaneously, if the aggregate surplus from higher education is zero, that is (3)
holds. Hence, there are two (positive) solutions to (22).Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 14
marginal introduction of fees does not improve educational quality. There is full crowding out
of public funds.













As fees improve the budget, ﬁscal eﬀectiveness of ¯ gD carries over to the presence of marginal
fees. .
The intuition behind this result is as follows. Under pure public funding, students enjoy a rent
from higher education, for the student participation constraint is not binding. A marginal
tuition fee skims oﬀ some of that rent and increases the net revenue of the government
without aﬀect the marginal return or the marginal cost of quality. As a consequence, the
model provides some support to the assertion that allowing for state regulated tuition fees
is not conducive to the quality of higher education. The next section investigates to what
extent this argument applies to decentralization.
4.1.2 Decentralization
While the presence of tuition fees does not aﬀect the mobility of graduates in period 2, they
inﬂuence the location choices of students in period 1. A talented child born in i attends the
university in its region of birth only if the migration cost exceeds the earnings diﬀerential net



















(1 − τ)w[h(ei) − h(ej)]
R
+ fj − fi)

, (24)
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− (e − f) ≥ 0, (26)
into account. Due to the arguments of the above sections, the student participation constraint
can be omitted from the problem.











τ(1 − π)(1 + h(ei))w − (ei − fi)R
i












∂fi ≤ 0, (28)
with strict inequality for ei = 0 and fi = 0, respectively.
The interpretation of (27) is analogous to (15). Regarding (28), each region trades oﬀ tuition
fees’ ﬁscal return on remaining students with the ﬁnancial consequences of lower enrolment.
These consequences are ambiguous for the loss in return from student emigrants is mitigated
by the taxes paid by additional graduate immigrants.
Imposing symmetry gives:
ΩD




[τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(e))w − (e − f)R] ≤ 0
ΩD
f = R −
2
M1
[τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(e))w − (e − f)R] ≤ 0. (30)
We are now in the position to answer to the questions raised in the introduction to this
section.
Proposition 4. Under decentralization, the marginal introduction of fees improves educa-













2(1 − τ)h0(¯ gD)w
M1
> 0.
21 Under the same assumptions as under pure public funding, B
i is concave in e
i. Moreover, B
i is unambigu-
ously concave in f
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Fees are introduced when ΩD





τ(1 − 2π)(1 + h(¯ gD))w − R¯ gD
.
By exploiting (29), this condition can be stated as (31). .
The quality increase is due to the simple fact that tuition revenues make resident students
more lucrative. Spurring the gain from increasing enrolment, quality competition intensiﬁes.
However, the marginal introduction of tuition fees requires the ﬁscal return from resident
students to exceed the reduction of the regional ﬁscal gain due to deterring students. This is
tantamount to the ratio between the marginal return per resident student and the change in
enrolment from increasing the fee to exceed the regional ﬁscal gain from attracting a student.
As educational quality is chosen such as to equate the regional ﬁscal gain from attracting
a student with the marginal return per resident student and the change in enrolment from
quality improvements, the condition for the introduction of fees can be stated as:22
R
τ(1 − π)h0(¯ gD)w − R
> −
2/M1
2/M1 · (1 − τ)h0(¯ gD)w
. (32)
The ratio between the marginal return per resident student and the change in enrolment must
be higher for fee increases than for quality increases. This condition is easily transformed
into (31). Whether it is fulﬁlled depends on τ and π, which shape directly and indirectly
(via h0(¯ gD)) the marginal return and enrolment change due to a quality increase. While (31)
shows that marginal tuition fees are worthwhile in the absence of ﬁscal leakage, we are unable
to show the generality of this property: while a stronger ﬁscal externality increases students’
responsiveness to quality increases, it produces ambiguous results on the marginal tax return.
The same applies for the tax rate the quality implications of which are ambiguous. However,
as regions rely on tuition fees for both very high and very low ﬁscal externalities, our results
do not raise too much concern that regional deterrence eﬀects scare regions oﬀ from utilizing
fees.23
Irrespective of that possible ambiguity, we have:
Proposition 5. The availability of marginal tuition fees tends to make educational decen-
tralization preferable to centralization: there exists a level of ﬁscal leakage ˜ ˜ π ≥ ˜ π, such that
educational quality is higher under decentralization than under centralization if π < ˜ ˜ π.
22 This condition encompasses the case of ﬁscal leakage being so high that the regional ﬁscal gain from
attracting a student is negative. In that case, fees involve no trade oﬀ, as it is better for the region to deter
than to attract students. Formally, the fraction on the left hand side in (32) is unambiguously positive as
τ(1 − π)h
0(¯ g
D)w > R, whereas the right hand side is negative.
23 A constellation where tuition fees will be deﬁnitely be dispensed with is quality overprovision. Then,
regions would rather want to pay transfers to students than charging fees. In order not to overburden the
analysis, we abstract from the possibility that regions engage in transfer (=negative fee) competition; see
Krieger and Lange (2010) on that topic.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 17
Proof. ˜ ˜ π < ˜ π is precluded by the fact that centralized quality does not change whereas
decentralized quality remains either constant or improves. ˜ ˜ π > ˜ π holds whenever regions
introduce fees for ˜ π. Because of ¯ gD = ¯ gC, this is tantamount to: h0(¯ gC)w > R






Due to ˜ π < 1/2, a suﬃcient condition for (33) to hold is τ < 2/3. .
Tuition fees address the underfunding problem under decentralization but not under cen-
tralization. As a consequence, the relative performance of decentralized higher education
improves whenever marginal fees are introduced and the availability of tuition fees recom-
mends a shift from centralization to decentralization on eﬃciency grounds for some levels of
ﬁscal externalities.
4.2 Full Discretion
In this subsection, we address the educational policy when governments can choose any non-
negative tuition fee level desired.
We start with the case of decentralization. The ﬁrst-order conditions characterizing regional
quality-/fee competition continue to be given by (29) and (30).
Proposition 6. Under full ﬂexibility of fees, decentralization implies positive educational
quality when the tax rate and the ﬁscal externality are suﬃciently low. Fees are positive when





When fees are zero, quality is the same as with pure public funding: eD = ¯ gD.
Proof. Solving (29) and (30) holding with equality gives (34). The condition for the intro-
duction of fees is still provided by (31). For τπ → 1, eD → 0 according to (34). As this
violates both (1) and (26), zero provision becomes optimal. .
For positive fees, the marginal gains from increasing fees and quality are equated. While
this leads to a quality improvement relative to the marginal introduction, underprovision
prevails whenever ﬁscal externalities are present. However, tuition fees are no remedy for
overprovision under pure public funding, as they will not be utilized in that case. As argued
above for the marginal introduction, governments would rather oﬀer subsidies than fees in
such a situation.
Things are diﬀerent when higher education is centralized.
Proposition 7. Under full ﬂexibility of fees, centralization leads to eﬃcient quality. The
tuition fee amounts to the lifetime earnings diﬀerential between academics and non-academics.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 18
Proof. Due to dB
df = S > 0, (1) must be binding for any optimal solution. Hence f =
(1 − τ)w(
h(e)




















the solution to which is e∗. .
Attempting to skim oﬀ as much private educational rent as possible, the fee will be set
such that the student participation constraint becomes binding. Receiving both the tax and
the net of tax return, the government becomes a kind of residual claimant to educational
investment. Hence the incentive to spend eﬃciently.
This result has consequences for the design of educational federalism.
Proposition 8. Under full ﬂexibility of fees, centralization leads to higher education quality
than decentralization when ﬁscal externalities exist. Decentralization is preferable from the
students’ perspective.
Proof. The ﬁrst assertion follows from comparing e∗ and the solution to (34). Students
enjoy no educational rent under centralization, because the student participation constraint
is binding. .
This ﬁnding highlights a possible conﬂict between eﬃciency and distribution. A full compar-
ison between centralization and decentralization would have to consider the designated use
of public revenues.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that the quality eﬀects of state regulated tuition fees depend crucially
on the degree of educational decentralization and the freedom of scope regarding fee levels.
We have shown that scepticism about the quality improvement argument can be justiﬁed, but
is limited to small-scale centralized fees, which is broadly consistent with the above-quoted
experiences in Australia and the UK. Federal competition precludes a similar development
under decentralized decision-making. Therefore, the availability of fees can make a shift
from a centralized to a decentralized system of university ﬁnance worthwhile. However,
centralization performs better in terms of quality when fees are fully ﬂexible, so the question
about the optimal degree of centralization depends on the existence of upper ceilings for fee
levels.
As it stands, the model has used a number of simplifying assumptions. First, we have
concentrated on symmetric equilibria under decentralization. Certainly, the possibility of
regional disparities, possibly produced by diﬀerences in regional endowments, requires further
investigation. However, it should be stressed that heterogeneity aﬀects both decentralizedEducational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 19
and centralized decisions (Besley and Coate, 2003).
Second, we have assumed that all students have the same ability to beneﬁt from higher
education. With heterogenous abilities, tuition fees would aﬀect the size and the productivity
of the student body. Allowing for this would mostly aﬀect the results under centralization.
Unless the government can charge tuition fees perfectly tailored to individual ability, it can
not appropriate the whole educational rent and the eﬃciency result under full discretion
is no longer valid. This possibly strengthens the case for decentralization. Regarding the
marginal introduction, our crowding out result remains intact whenever the student with
the lowest ability enjoys some positive rent under pure public funding. With free university
access, such a rent would not exist for the marginal student would be indiﬀerent between
going to university or not. However, this reasoning ignores the widespread use of admission
standards. Indeed, a revenue-maximizing government has an incentive to keep individuals of
lower ability oﬀ university in order to concentrate educational expenditures on the most able.
Hence, for all students admitted, the student participation constraint would not be binding
for pure public funding.
And third, we have not addressed the issue of regional tax competition. A number of studies
has shown that the strive for mobile graduates puts a downward pressure on regional taxes
(Anderson and Konrad, 2003), which would weaken incentives to provide pure public edu-
cation under decentralization. However, the eﬀects in the presence of tuition fees are not
straightforward.24 First, a lower tax rate slackens the student participation constraint for
given expenditures and fees. Second, tax competition can be mitigated as fees make up for
a ﬁnancing source independent of future student residence. And third, the fundamental dif-
ference in incentives to substitute public funds for tuition fees derived above still applies. In
general, we expect that the overall result depends on the division of educational and tax re-
sponsibilities between local and federal governments, an issue that we leave for future research
just like the related question whether results could be improved by university autonomy.
24 See Krieger and Lange (2010) for a respective analysis where educational quality is constant.Educational Federalism and the Quality Eﬀects of Tuition Fees 20
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